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PREFACE
This study encompasses a period which was probably
'the most significant in American steamship history -- from
the hurtling of the GENERAL SLOCUM (1904) to 1925•

It

is

not tin.usual tor a major disaster
to touch off a broad
.
'

investigation into problems not necessarily directly related
.to the. disaster itself.

Thus, such studies provide data
I

of interest 1n a general study; this is why the present
paper deals so heavily in events while stressing trends.
Beoause of the range of some of these investigation reports,
a problem presents itself as to the ·proper soope a paper
on "fire safety" should have.
Our considered opinion after working 1n the a11.bject is
that 1 t was necessary to study a;J.l aspects of safety cov.ered
in the contemporary investigations.

As this paper progresses

into the stuqy of the period, the justification for this
position -should become evident.· ·
·were· we·. to take up a series of studies on the various
aspects of fire safety, such as inspection, smoke detection,
or sprinklers, we would have a disjointed thesis.

But by

covering a period of time, we are able to see the topic in
the light of human reactions and government operations.

We have taken a period of history which is fairly
clearly defined and self•l1mit1ng and have taken all
discussions directly or indirectly relating to factors
involved in ship fires during that period.
Obvious starting point is the GENJmAL SLOCUM fire,
as will be seen 1n first chapter, which taltes up the

progress of fire safety and American steam.boat inspection
before this disaster.
The year 1925 as an end is rather less easily defined.
For one thing, the retirement of Inspector-General George
Uhler in that year ended a continuous career at the head
of safety inspection and thus marks a symbolic "end of an
era".

Another reason for stopping at 1925 is the Clyde

Steamship Company's rather strange series of fires during
that year; which are covered in the author's undergraduate
thesis on the subject at the University of Richmond,
Further, and most important, any study from 1925 onward
would of necessity entail topics.which are naturally
prefatory to the second International Conference on Safety
of Life a.t Sea.

CHAPTER I
.AMERICA!~

FIRE SAFETY BEFORE 1904

The awesome threat of fire aboard a ship at sea,
even in this day of wireless and the "fireproof" ship,
is one of the great fears of mankind.

How much more so

it was when steamers were of wood, unregulated as to
cargo and construction!

Prior to the momentous New York

harbor excursion boat fire aboard the GENERAL SLOCUM in
1904, which took 955 lives, public awareness and thus

Congressional action, on fire safety a.board ships was

next to nil.

1

Insurers, if not the public and the shipping

trade, knew early that fire was the main cause of total loss
of steam.ships at sea; the first transoceanic voyage of a
partly-steam vessel, the SAVAlillAH, was refused +nsurance

for this reason. 2
The first legislative regulation of steamship
construction related to .fire safety was the Act of July

7, 1838, which required inspection annually of steamer
hulls and semi-annually of boilers, but this merely checked
£or possible explosion danger.

Likewise, the Acta of

March 3, 1843, requiring signal lights and after steering,
1. James M. Merrill, uThe Day New York Shocked the
World,,. Steamboat Bill, XVIII (Fall, 1961), 67.. 73.
Edward N. Hurley, The New Merchant Marine (New
York: The Century Company, 1920), 14.
2.

2

regulated only cases of explosion and collision.3
Two memorable steamship fires, the. LEXINGTON and the.
G. P. GRIFFITH, had much effect of a positive nature on
the

e~rliest

United States steamer safety regulations,

so muoh so that they rate discussion here..

First of these,

a.board the LEXINGTON in Long Island Sound, 1840, was
important

~n

bringing-about the 1843 Acts.

The.1838 Act

had required thr_ee iifeboa:ba on each passenger· steamer, but
had

not called for firefighting tools. perhaps on the premise

that a ship afire cannot ba saved, but must be a.bandoned. 4
Investigations of the LEXINGTON fire by authorities caused
a popular stir, even to the extent that the proceedings
were published in book f'orm the same month, January 1840. 5
Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt, who had built· the ship
but said he had sold her in 1838, stated that her boiler
had had 30% more . boiler fastenings
. than required, was
quoted as making the rather sensational statement that "I
.

don't recollect wether she ever took fire -· it is so
common a thing for a steamboa:b to take fire, that I cannot
.really remember about. the Lexington".

6

.. ~ 4. J. H. Morrison, "Fire Protection for Steam Vessels
and Government Regulations", Scientifi;o An+erican Supplepen~;
LVIII (July 16, 1904), 23860.
.
.
.

3

She hs.d a fire engine, ·but Congress was moved to make
tur·ther requirements for fire safety; the Congressional
committe's recom.rnenda.tions included sheet iron lining for
bo11er rooms, an underlining of sheet lead in the boiler's

wake• a constant Iire watch, and more sufficient lifeboats,
but the aotual legislation was far less. 7
The second of the early fires to bring action was

that aboard the G. P. GRIFFITH, which burned June 17, 1850,
lTi th

326 aboard, most ot whom died.

..The GRIFFITH caught

fire on Lake Erie; lodged on a bar, and was destroyed there. 8
The SteamboaD Act of August 30, 1852 resulted from the
stir which foll01red this fire; this Act was the basic lalr

for steamship safety for over three-quarters of a century.
Clearance of 18" wao required between any hot boiler, pipes,
or machinery and any woodwork or other combustible, w·i th

· free air circulation about any hot metal.

Authority for

organized inspection service was given in the legislation
by

providing for nine supervising inspectors to look after

the local inspection

of

lifeboats, life preservers,

5. AnonY!Il-ous, Loss of the L x nrrtoa (Providences
H. H. Brown o.nd A. H. Stillwell, 184-0 , 5, 6.

6~ ~·
7•

Harrison, .QJ2.. cit. s, 23861 •

8. Dana Thom.as B.o·hren, Shtpwreclts of' the
Bea.ch: Dans. Thomas Bow~n, 1952 , 18-19.

La.lees:

(Daytona

4
lioens~g

of passenger vessel engineers and pilots, and

req11ired the stamping of boiler plates by :to cal inspectors

of boilers after they had approved each plate.

The Act was

successively amended over the yeurs.9
The 1852 Act was
the inspectors.

haile~

as a great improvement by

The supervising inspectors were meeting

as an informal board to unify their efforts; in 1857 they
oi tad that there had been appreciable iiecline in loss of'
life by explosions due to the new laws! 0 But fire and collision
were now the

majo~

problem for American steamers.

The use

of hair felt had been tried successfully in 1855, and soon
came into acceptance.

However, it was not ··antil. 1875.}that

iron deck beams were being used a.round the boiler areas. 11_
The first iron-hulled steamer built in the United States
is thought tb. have been the J,. W. EVERY'iA.N, around 1.850, and
the first all-steel steamer the IROQUOIS, built in 1886.
It should be noted here that

"e~ll-steel"

did not mean that

the wood components were largely gone, but that the hull and
major structural members were metai. 12
Smoking on ships seems to be one of the principal
fire hazards, then and now. ·

Tho~gh

today there are many

"no smoking" signs on every ship, there is much suspicious
· g.

Morrison, 9.ll• cit., 23861 ;

~.

SBIS Report, 1905.

10. United States House of Representatives, 35th
Congress, First Session, Executive Document 3 (Washington:
1857). 212.
11.

lhli·•

215; .G.t:· Morrison,~· cit., 23861.

5
investigation into the place of oigarets in causing a great
number of steamer fires;· a paper today and one half a century
ago on the subject might use similar language in regards to
this ma.tter. 13
The formation of a formal Board of Supervising Inspectors

and a Supervising Inspector-General at Washington did not
elL~inate

the evil of paying the local inspectors of boilers

and inspectors of hulls by the fees they collected t. but 1 t
did provide an office at Washington~ 14
The Board submitted to Congress some futile attempts
et reform of inspection

an~

safety for American

steamers~

One was before Congress.March 29, 1904 1 just before the
SLOCUM disaster, but was relegated to the special limbo for
reforms not under outside

pressure~

But on June 15 of that

year, the SI,OCU:M burned and some few attitudes were to change. 15

Even

after the SLOCUM

fire, a- maritime authority,,

uriting on fire at sea, said:
"It is one of the risks of the trade;
and of course every trade has its special risks~n1 6
Yet another engineering authority, speaking before the
12.
844 Develo n the World's Mos Ma
cent
Fleet of Ooastw se Steamers a
e L ne New York: Pe~ssenger
Traffic Department, Clyde Steamship Company, 1927), ~' 1~.·

1:;. I11Iorrison,,. on • .Ql.t,.; .£!• "Digest of an article
appearing in the April. 1954 issue of the Scandinavian Insurance
Quarterly transle~ed py Hans Von He1jne of the Svea•Nornan
Insurance co., Gothenburg, Sweden" (Mimeographed MS in the
Library of the Insurance Society, 150 William St., New York).

-

'\

'

\ ,·,

6

fire, stated that:
11

the subject • • • has not yet received the
attention it deserves from shipowners, ship'hrtill\ers.
underwriters* or,. as a matter of fact, from the
, 1)ublic authorities controlling our maritime affairs. tt 17

This samo author ·continues, lashlne; out a·t ·the
thon~current

attitude:

nrn fact, if only sh1.powners and shipbuilders
te.ke the matter to heart, they 1-rould find.
that the moment they really wished to make their
vessels safer from· :fire, they wou.ld be able to do
so at a very small cost; whilst, of course, as
long as they look upon safeguards with d1sfavour'1
the extra expense will be described as enormous.' 18

l-TOuld

14.

SBIS Report, 1905.

15. Lloyd M. Short, Steamboat-InsMcction Service (New
·York: D. Appleton and Oompany; 1922J, 1 •
16.

Lawrence Perry, trFire at Sea", Ametican Mar;azine,

LX (October, 1905), 599-608.
17.

Edwin o. Sachs,

18.

Ip1g., 279•

11

Prevention on Board Ships",
of the In~~itution of Nav41 Architects and
Ma:rine ;§ngineera, XLVI {1904), 273, 27 •

l._~s~ct!qns
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CHAPTER II
TH.E GEUERAT.1 SLOCtm CASE

On an overcast-Thursday morning, June 15, 1904, the

[Oursion boat GENERAL SLOCUM set off for an eventful cruise
estined to kill 955 before the-burned-out hulk would beach
tseli' on Little Brother Island just a few miles-Up-New York

arbor.-

The congregation of st. Hark' s Lutheran Church,

1cnicking aboard, was almost wiped out by the holocaust
~ich

swept the all-wood ship unchecked by any trained crew

r usable fire gear; the paddle boxes, where the boat's

ropellors churned the ship on course until bodies jammed
~em

to a halt, were a mass of carnage; the captain paid no

ttention to the thousands who burned and screamed below as
e refused to beach even after the SLOCUM was no·thing but

floating pyre in the middle of the city.

Those who jumped

Lear were little better off, for the life preservers they
~re

mostly were weighted with bar iron or were rotten from

quarter century in the salt a1r.19
So horrible uas the incident that it prompted the
irgest investigation

~to

safety of passenger ships since

lle GRIFFITH and LEXIilGTON cases..

A United States Commission

tarted to investigate soon after the fire, reporting on
Jtober 8.

19.

The investigators found that the inspection
Merrill; .2Jl• cit.

8

certificate llad been sighed in the names of, but not by,
James A. Dtuuont, inspector of hulls, and Themas H. Barrett,
inspector of boilers. for the port.

The certificate had been
granted 1~1ay 6, 1904 for the oarryi11g of 2,500 excursioners. 20
First procoeJlngs to try to find the cause of the f1ra

. was the coroner's 34nquest at ne1·r Yorlc.

It turned out there

that Dunant an'l Barrett had never actually inspected the
s{lip. but that an uuderl:lnz,

a~3$istant

inspeo-'Gor Henry

Lundberg, had been in charGe of the inspection.
refused to testify.

21

Lundberg

The president of tho firm o·wning the

SLOOu1{ showed bills for the new life preservers he said
had been recently bought for the vessel, but it was later
shown that these were aboard another liner. 22 I·t was also
shown that the life preseryers actually aboard were :1orn
out from rot and had been inacoeosible. 23

Four indictments were handed dorm by the' grand jury of
the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York on July 24, 1904 under Section 5344 of the
Statutes at Large, not under the steamboat act. Captain
William. I!. Van Schs.ic!i: wao indicted for misconduct,

negligence, and inattention to duty; managing directors
Frank A. Barnaby, James K. Atkinson, Frank E. Dexter, and
20. Re2Qht of the Un~ted States Commission o~
Inve t C?"at on U on t:he Disaster to the. Steamer "General,

-Slocum 1 October , 19Q1 Washington: G~vernment Printing
Office, 1901~), hereafter referred to as "SLOCUH Comm., 9.

21. John Wesley Hanson, ed., New York's Awful
Excursion Boe.t Fire (Melt York: 1904), 250•251.
22.

~.,

246.

23.

Ibig., 258.

9
John A. Pease 1rnre :?..ndicted to stand trial for aiding and

abetting him in these offenses.
John

w.

.ll.ssista.nt inspectors

Fleming and Henry Lundberg were indicted for fraud,

misconduct, and inattention to duty.

Another indictment

was filed against Van Schaick, Burnaby, Atkinson, Dexter,
and Pease for aiding and abetting the Knickerbocker
Steamship Coupany in fraud, misconduct, and inatten·tion to

duty; Captain Van Schaick was indicted alone for various other
offenses 24
During the investigations it was found that the life
preservers had been weichted to bring them up to the required

six

pou..~d

weight by inserting bar iron in the cork panels;

the manufacturers were indicted for

to defraud
the government and to prejudice the inst;>ection laws. 25
con~piring

?resident Theodore Roosevelt, 1.n his preface to the
investigation reports, said of the bar iron scandal:
" • • • This last offense was of so heinous a
that it is difficult to comment upon
1 t with proper self'-restrai12t. It appea.rR ·the
national legislature has never enactecl a lm·r
providing in set· terms for the punishment of
this particular SJ.'ecies of infamy, doubtless
because it uever entered the head of any man
that so gross an infamy could be perpetrated • • • • tt26
~.Jw.racter

The

u. s.

Commission inquiry found that there we..s

"no consideration whatever given to the question of
inflamma.bili ty. ••

The SLOCUH was all of wood, much-painted

24. SLOCUM Gomm., 61; .£.t• U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York cases CR. D-3351,
CR. D-3354, and CR. D-3354, National Archives.

25.

SLOCUM Comm., 61, 62.

26.

SLOCUM Comm,, 4.

10

and tinder-dry, and the commission found that "the sole
protection of such a vessel against fire depends on prompt
extinguishment at its early inception".

Thus, the investigators
called for better rules on extinguishment equipoent. 27
Life preser..rers were taken up at length, and the la1-r
was found sorely wanting.

The maximum passenger load limit

policy was questioned ('limits were set

by

inspectors), and

it ·was found that law did not require life preservers for
all aboard.

Ferries were required at that time only enough

for the average number to be carried, and excursion barges
in tow needed only

25 to comply with law, no matter how many

passengers were aboard; to top it all off, the regulations of
.
8
quality were found wanting. 2
On the matter of extinguishing apparatus, stringent
reformed rules were:. advised by the commission.

Cheap linen

hose then in vogue was found to deteriorate too rap:1.dly to
offer any practical assurance that there would be hose ready
to use when needed, and the myriad of couplings in use were
recommended to be standardized.
. hand

A requirement to install

fire extinguishers was recommended; carbon dioxide

smothering devices for cargo holds were urged if equivalent
to the

then~cnrrent

steam systems. The ease of casting off

27 •

SLOCIB-1 Comm. 1 11, 51-52.

28.

SLOCUM Comm., 52.

11

lifeboats 1n an emergency situation was also stressed as
needing refors. 28
Locus of respons1 bili ty we.a taken up by the conm1ssion

next, and it was found that the ce.ptain L"'l modern times is
less independent than formerly, uhen captains were more
than mere enployees of a corporate giant and in many cases

owned all or part of

their ships; the commission wanted more

responsibility put

the 01mers, but wanted the captains

011

responsible to the Steam.boat-Inspection Eervic,e on

conditions a.board the ship and frequency of fire drills.
~hG

investigators further asked that the duties of the

captain in equ:i..pp:i.nt; a.'l"l.d navigation of the vessel be

defined in tho light of modern practice, and the responsibilty
of a charterer actually operating a vei:::sel was questioned. 29
·rho powel"S, duties, and method.s of pay of the inspectors

waa alsv scrutinized by the com.rrtissioners.

Inspectors,

they said. should nave the po1·rer to see condemned equipment

destroyed, with the power to withhold a certificate until

this io clone.

Since re:l:nspect1on was required onlyt.a'J; a

se.t schedule, the inspectors• po'tiers to reinspect in case

of suspicious situations was reoom.111ended with threat of
revooat:i.on for refuse..l.

----

.After the SLOCUH fire, the

53.

28.

SLOOUM Corrmi.,

29.

SLOCUM Comm., 53-51~, 60.

12

Knickerbocker Steam.ship Company hc.d balked

tr~ee

M.mes on

requests by the commission to reinspect the GRAND REPUBLIC,
a sister ship, and finally the inspectors were forced into
a partial survey \·rhile the ship was

ru.i."111L~g.

When a danger-

ous state of affairs was found; the owners had flatly
refused to lay her up or remedy the situation. The commissioners wanted the inspectors to have the right to order a
fire or boat drill at any tirae and a reinspection at any
reasonable time.

The hull inspector, they:-said, should be

required to inspect all.compartments and check lights at n1ght.3C
As to the ectuel methods of inspections, the commission
ad.vised that inspectors should hand.le each life preserver,
checlc all hose at a hundred pounds per square inch, and
check all pumps 1n actual operation; previously the fire
apparatus had to be checked by both men during the survey,
but the investigation commission thought that they i::hould

be permitted to worlc separately to save time.

Furthermore~

the recommendation was nade that the persons actually doing
the inspection should sign the inspection certificate.3 1.
Third ~mong the intense investigations into steamship
fire safety in the walte ·of the SLOCUM fire was the meeting

of the Board 0£ Supervising Inspectors

30.
31.

SLOOU1~

qomm,J 55, 56.

SLOCUM Comm., 56, 58.

~eeting

called for

13

October 25 which sat through December 15; many x·eports were
heard regarding rules, and the supervising inspectors looked
at many types of lifeboats and other devices.

The regular

m~eting

on January 18, 1905 made more recommendations
for legislation and made some chenges in the regulations.3 2
board

The Supervising Inspector-General'R report for 1905 1e
a comprehensive l1st1ne of grievances; we will examine some
of them now.

Inspector-General George Uhler' s principe.l

topic was the fireproofing of excursion boats, a 300' al.l•
steel one being under 0011struction a-'1J the time. lle asked.
that this type of construction be ;required.33
Further flaws in the law were cited by this report,
many reiterations of previous complaints.

The inspectors

·complained that they were powerless to inspect vessels
operated by power other than steam under 15 tons displace•
ment, though steam passenger vassels were controlled
regardless of size.

Uhler stated:

There is no good reason why a vessel propelled
by motor other than steara should be exempted from
any of the requirements demanded of a steam vessel,
or should be granted privileges ·not accorded others" 34
0

32.

SBIS Report, 1905, 19-20.

33.

SBIS Report, 1905, 21.

34.

SBIS Report, 1905, 10.

14
whic~

Crude oil,

did not enter the

SLOCl~I

case,

1ras taken up as a fire hazard in the. :tnspectors' report.
lJhler pointed out that though it was forbidden as freight

with passengers aboard, it was permitted as fuel on passenger vessels with the consent of the
and

Labor~· .. The

Secret~ry

of Commerce

Inspector-Gener&..l wanted a mintmu.11 flash

point of 140° Fahre11hei t req_uired as e. fire sa.fety factor. 35

Resultant

legisla~ion,

apprmrcd i:1n.rch 3, 1905 1 amended

or repealed 21 ·sections of' the ste'lmboci.t laws; unly one-:third

that many titles were changed

lTi thin

the next two a·ecades •

and raost of these were minor by com:parison.36
The repor·r. of the SLOCU.H com.mission ?-lld the report of

the Secretary o:f Commerce went to the chairman of the
House Oommi ttee ,on Merchant M&.rine and Fisheries, Charles
H. Grosvenor of Ohio, dated January 20, 1905.

It included

eight proposed bills to correct the many problems 0.1scovered

1n th e course

~
OJ.

t~.
t•1ga ti ons. 37.
ne inves

But Conc;ress had already been activ·e following the

SLOCUM fire.

.! Congressional

Commission to investigate the

state of the merchant marine had been appointed to report

·on the general field o.f resulat1on; it h9.d. asked and gotten

35.

SBIS Report, 1905, 16-17.

36. United States Depa·rtment of Co1mnerce, Laws
GoverniM, tqe s~eamhofi t-Ins,n~ct1on .s.erv4or (Washington:
Govern:nent Printing Office, June 24, 1905J.

15

a m.onth' s delay in the duo d~te of its report frorl December

5, 1904 ·to January 5, 1905.

T~~e

repo:.-t wn.o lntrod.uced

on January 4. ni th a ninori ty report a ttachecl.

Two days

lcter the Cor.nnission recalled the paper and the included
sugr:sestetl le13isla·cion in vim1 of developneats (prol:o.bly tllc

forthcoming Secretary of Co:.:mcrco roport). 38

Outsido of the

eigb.t bills proposed in the Sec:;."'otary' o report, only t·wo others
lTere ever reported.

OJ1e

of thcce, :J GJi.09, to U:!leno. the

inspection laws on :po.ssengcr lints, wco reported January

19, passed the Senate February 1, _pac:sed the house Februury
3 and was signed by Pres1dt.nt .rh0odoro Roocovolt
1

Feb~tw.ry

9.

This act outlined methods for liBtln5 ace, se:c, citizenship,
and cause of des:th i f the passenger were to die on boai.. d.

The other, "to amend Section lr.472 of the :le-:risoa Str.. tu.tcs
so as to rer.iove certain

restr~ctions

upon the transpor·ta t1on

by steam vessels of gasoline and petroleu.m when carried

f:1n gas tanks of cars being shipped_] • •
duo~d

January 10.

.", was intro-

It provided that so long as· there was

no sparl( in the enr:;ine, cars could be shipped w1 thout ha v1ng
to drain the gas tanks.

Th3 bill passed, with some confusion

as to when the spark should be turned off, and was signed

37. .v. ·R. 1'1etcalf, Improvement o.r Laws, Steamboatns act. o Servic ,, House Document 258, 53th Congress t Third
Session Washington: Government Printing Of"i'ioe, 1905 Jt
hereafter referred to a~ "Doc 258.u

38.

Con~ressional

Record, 58th Congressl Third Session,
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905J XXXIX, hereafter
referred to as "CR 39"• 4, 449, 530.

16

by the President dated ?ebruary 17.39
As will soon be seen, these are
compared to what was recommended by

~nthcr ~inor
i.~a.r1ous

Acts

investigators;-

the real actio·n on the SLOCUM caoe bills was to come
between introduction of the Secretary of Comraerce' s letter

and the President's. approval of reform 1ec;1slat1on on
Narch 3.

The letter was api,roved by the Uouse for

publication on January 23, thun stE.rting the clw.1n of events

with the introduction of the ei[;ht bills.

The same bills
were concurrently introduced into the Senate tl1en. 40
First of the bills considered wac tho propooal to allow
the -executive cotillllttee,pf the Board of Supervising Inspecters to make interim changes in the reGulatlons of the
Board at the call of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and
with his approva.l.

This bill parrned both houses i:rt·t;h only

an amendment requiring suf'f1clent public notice as to the
· ,
b e f ore t•ne me e .1.1y
- 41
propose c anges
v 4ig.
d

h

Fees collected for the inspection of ships had formerly

been the principal source of- inspectors' incomes.

The

second bill was -desisned to elinin.a. te .abuses causecl by

this systen, settinG the salaries 07 local inspectors based
39.

CR 39, 1817, 1906, 2482, 1274,. 2:411

L!-0.

GR 39' 1276' 12eo.

41..

CR

39,

1274, 2053t 240L~, 3632.

t

2469, 1907.
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on fees collected the previous year, defining the duties of
ess1stant inspectors, and. perm1tting·the Secretary of
Commerce ·and Labor to transfer assistant local inspectors
according to need..

Though the bill passed, its intent was

·warped somewhat with pork barrel additions•

As

the bill

at first read, there were to be six groups of inspectors
with salaries from $1200 to $2500.

Grosvenor introduced the

bill with the statement that "vessels naturally go for in-

spection where inspection is most lax and the premium is
therefore placed on inferior and improper work , ••

1"

but

Cincina.tti' s inspectors we're in the $1200 class: before the
b1.11 could ,pass the .House, the Loutsville and Ciiicinattf

inspectors were raised to

the

~1500 bracket.

Representative

James B. Mann of Illinois attacked the bill by saying
that it was the same bill which had been defeated the year
before, " • • • and the GEllERAL SLOCUM disaster has simply
been used as an entering wedge and as a hammer to put

through a proposition which I understand originally was
simp].y to increase the pay of the inspectors."
his a.mend.ments . was the pay·,· 'raia e • 42.

One of

After House passage of the b,111 with Louisvi.lle and
Cino1natt1 pay r~ises, the- senate passed the bill with alt
the #1200 inspectors getting raises to '$1500.

Those_who

got the increases in pay were the local inspectors of hulls ·and
42.

CR 39, 1274·, 2053, ~561, :2407, 2666.
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boilers for: Bnngor, Haine; Apalachicola, Ploricia; Evans-

ville, Incliana; Memphis, Tennessee; Nashville, Tennessee;
Burli:agton, Vermont; Gallipolis, Ohio; Wheeling, West
Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida.

The House concurred. l~3
c~ll-encom:passing

Third among the bills was the most

of them, which included the pr0Yisio11 already passed on

gasoline in the ta:nks ·of es.l"'S betne; shipped.
provisions included

Et

proh:i.bi tion ,?.::_::8.inst assistant in-

specters having interest in a shi"? or

used

on 'ships;

Other

~n

e. ps.tent article

to perrn.i t open launches to cover thei1•

inspection certifice:ces n.o a me. tter of pract:tcali ty; to
pu·t; fifteen-ton r.otor vessels under the penal provis5.ono
Of the steambo2.t la1m; to allow ap!)eal

t.hrou~h

the super...

vising inspectoJ: to the inspector-general :ln ca.seo of

suspension or

revocatio~

of

lice~seo;

allow carbon dioxide

for srnothori'ng firec if ac1eqn8.te; to require henp and cotton
to be bagged in liJte ma ter1.als to prev-en·t chafing; to require
aolle~tors

of customs to see inspection certificates before .

g1"ru1ting ships• papers; to incJ,.ude motor vessels in the Red

and Mississippi Rivers under ·rules of the road for steamers
elsewhere. 44

--43.

CR 39, 3632, 3773.

Doc 258,

;.~

..
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This bill

";·;a.3

reported lri·thout
m2J~e

L"'J.troducecl :fi th the othero 1.n a pc:.ckage and

2.mana~1ent;

e.n effort on t.hc !.Iouoe floor to

it cover only v-essels c::.rryill3 passenccrs for hire ua.s

rejected.

There

-;1aB

consiclerable o:ppocltion to the blll :tn

the House, 1n.l.t :i:t emer.:;ed from Con,sresz
men t to

m~ke

its 1rording the

80.He m~

~rith

only

2.n n.~.~.cnd-

tho for!!'. Cr bill on

cu.r1"'iagc of sasolino i::.1 auto

of tlw four·bh reform bill sub:r..itted., i:rl th m:i.nor ch2nsc frorn

Secretary llctoalf' s vDrsion.

An:.1t~al

i:rnpoction

~~c.r 1m~

oonpulsory and conde'.lllla ti.011 of doiocti Ye
be effoctivoly carri0c.l out.

T:.ie lesson.

i)ccam~

loc.:cn~d

n.o-:·r to

by tlle

reinspoction of the GRA.lID RE:PtmLIC ( ::mur~~, p. 12) 1ras. C.:Jplied
by muk:ln.::.; 1 t po:::sible for tho lns:.wctora to rcvo1:c tho

cGr"'11:i...ficatc of a. veosel

inspections"

fo:mc~

Life prosm."'Vcra

to bo clcfcctivc bcti:rncn a.lli-iual
~rere

to be provided fol' each

parson aboard and crl!:1innl action 1·ras provided for willful

sale of darective lifesaving upparatu3.

Tarn charterers

were nade liable for violations of lalr and re5ulatio:1s on

ships they operated and the directors and officers of
corporp;tions 02era.ting ships ;·rere liable for misconduct
I

in the operation of thei:.r vessels.

An

a~endr:ient

to require

that 75%· of the cre1-r of licensed vessels be 19 years of age

43.

CR 39, 1274, 2053t 2407, 2708, 3632, 3773~
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with three years'

exper~ence,

rojcc·~ed

but tl\is was

on the

groi:mds that such a provision wou.J.G. put the Great Lclces
46
u.nder the Seamen's Union.

With the fifth and sixth bills of the series, we see
an. example of ..'What was not passed being; Iaoro cloq.uent than
what was.

T"'ne sixth bill, to amencl Sect;ion

1~399

of the

Revised Statutes so as to place all ves;;;,;ls IJO":rnred in. whole
or.l:ln part by stoa.m or other mechiner3r and carryinG; passengers
.for hire under the insp(\)ction lawo,

d~d

or during the

by

en"'~lre

pe1 iod
1

~ovorec.l

not imss this M.me
·~LJ.s

Dtudy.

Tho

bill died in comml ttee, anci was tho only one o.f tho SI,OCUM
h7

bills not reported.

r

Omnibus changes in tlle stea11boa t

12::·~::

Hore co-:re:red by

the fifth bill, which changed corto.in [let;;i.:1.J.:J fro':'l the

statutes to the luspec·t;ion 3ervica

rcgula·~10ns;

1nspeoto:rs were abolished because they were
a fee system and no lou3cr handled

lfL011ey.

110

bonds of
1011c;e:r under

One section of

the bill did not pasa, this being. tile pt.i.rt to allow the
Board of Superv1siilg Inspectors to cpprove innovations 1n

boiler fastening and to :;;.llow slll.e.;le rivet1ns of boilers due
h.8
to advanced methods of construction. ·
The seventh bill, designed to allm·r the inspccto:cs to

46.

Doc

258, 3;

OR 39,. 127Lr.,

2053,

2 1!-04,

2405, 2453,

2891, 3632, 3773.

47. Doc 258, 4, 13; CR 39, 1274; SBIS Reports. passim.
48.

Doc 258, 4; CR 39, 18201, 1274, 2053; 2406, 2453,

2708, 3632.
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determine the number of licensed officars and crewmen a ship
should carry.

1Iere an attempt to put the 755'°

tr~ ined

crew

r;rovision into the bill was partially sn0coscful, with the

inland river boats exempted, but tho bill itnelf nas not pas4
sed. 9 Another fatality among the bills e,ttached to the
Secretary of' Commerce report, though

~- t

't'ms not properly a

SLOCUM. case bill, was a bill for the appointment of a

commission on marine construct1on.50
Even with this mortality rate of proposed reform laws,
1905 ranlts as the high point for the twenty years to follow •

.At this point, while we are discussing legislation, it is
appropriate to £ollow the course of some of the laws mentioned
above.

Subsequent amendments to this legislation included:

March f.7, 1906:

to impose more

June 30, 1906:

to amend Section 4471 on fire pumps.

inspectio~

on foreign ships.

March 4,. 1909:

to amend Section 107 of the.Penal Code, on
illegal fees and Section 282 of the Penal Oode
on loss of life at sea due to misconduct of
officers and others.

July 17, .1914:

to anend Section 4474, on carriage of
crude 011.

March 29, 1918.:

to· amend Section 4472, on petroleum as
ship's stores.

~Iarch

. concorninr; 1then the s:parlc in the engine
of an automobile being shipped raust be put out.51

2, 1925:

49.

CR 39, 2404i 3633; Doc 258, 5.

50.

CR 39, 1274; Doc 258, 5, 14.

51.

La.vrs Govet"n1.n.c; the Steamboa t-Inspect:ton Service 1.925.
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CHJ\.PTER III
FIRE SAFETY .FRO] THE SLOCUH CASE TO LOiffiOH 00lf.P2'!~mrnE

The Supervising

Inspector-Ge~eral's

report for 1906

renewed the plea for regulation on the trannportat1on of
crude oil, which ·was not to cone until 1914; ao to ·the
laws gr0111ng out of the SLOCUH case, ho cnid tl1.ey were working
well by

i;::')

then.::.>~

He stated that the iron fireproof czcurs1on
he had mentioned in 1905 (su.DAn, p. 13)

construction had been a succons.

·as

steai.~er

being unde1

1

This vessel 1m.s the

J Jl...HtillS TOWN, built for tra,ffic between Wo.shington s.:!d Norfolk

during the Jmnest01-m Te1•ecentenary; she wns ot1"1cken from·
Lloyd 1 ,s Register of Shipp5.ng

to· a lichtcr."
~uto

8.

fm·r years la tcr as "converted

In fact, by 1909 she hcd already been s_old

l

Argentine. for the coasting ser-vic~; Uhler insisted,

:iowever, in h:1s :re}?orts, that such construction should 'be
required by law.53
Po..1luro of Congrcos to en2.ct. a law imttinc; motor ships

of similar tvnoo VJ1.der the same rules as ntean vessels rras
4'....

.

a running theme of Uhler'o reports throughout the period of
this study.

All motor vessels had to do for officers was to

52.

SBlS Report 1906, 14-15.

53.

Daily Press, Newport

News,~De~ember

19,

1952;~

n.aut,j..ue.1...Q.g.zctte '.• January 27, 191 O; .uBI~--, Report 1906, 1::.;-16.
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carry

a

licensed

pa.ss~ngers,

u Oll0l"a tortt

for ca:ptain, even if carrying

so lcm.g as they were UYJ.c1.er fifteen tons.

"Operators" needed no .exa.minD.tion.

Such

There -::ms no ·nay of

restricting the number of :passengers a motor ves;;.;el could
carry nor ·was there provision for their safety between five
and fifteen tons.

Under five tons, Uhler conplained, a motor

vessel 1·ras subject to no restrictions whatso·ever.54

During

this time, the Presiden.t_: appointed a cornnission to susGest
revision of the safety la1rs, but nothing concrete came of it.55
The Act of June 9; 1910, not included in the Steamboatinspection laws, required license inspection for o:perato:-cs
of motor vessels, certain safety devices, and revocation of
the licenses of iTiola tors, but still Section 4399 was not
changes and motor vessels were not lUlder the steamboat law.56
Therefore 1 the uninspectad classes of motor vessels were
drarring trade from the ·smaller inspected steamers; the

steam.boats were then .further regUlated by a rule which called
for auf'ficient boats or rafts for all aboard.57

By 1914, the inspectors still were complaining about
motor vessels.

Uhler called

permitt~.ng

bouyant cushion as

the only life preserver required on a motor passenger ship
11 11ttle

short of criminal."

He statecl that a steam tugboat

54.

SBIS Report 1907, 14.

55.

SBIS Report 1908, 14.

56.

SBIS Report 1911, 14; SBIS Report 1910, 13.

57.

SBIS Report 1912, 14, 18.
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crew was better protected from fire ·than a passenger on a
motor vessel •. and said. that the ll.o·t; of June 9, 1910 "far
from meets the proper requirements for safeguarding life
a11d property.''

vessel.lobby.

He pulled no punches in lashing at the motor

"That upon which the owners of these vessels

have insisted has not been liberty, but license. and the time
has come when this matter should be given attention.u5B
If there was any real general interest during this
period in fire at sea as a separate safety problem, it
evidently did not a.r:i>ear in print too conspicuously.

The

Library ·of Congress bibliography of select sour.ces on fire

:prevention in 1912

carr~~d

only three titles on fire at sea

among 221 listings. 59
Awareness of fire ::.at sea may have been reawalcened by

the loss

of

the Canadian

~orthc.rn

Steamship Company

immigrant ship VOLTURNO.at sea October 9, 1913 ·with 136

lives lost.

Let us hear the story from a contemporary:

11 It:,was

early on Thursday morning (October 9)

th.at fire broke out. ·The vessel's hold was filled
with terribly inflammable substances, such as
chemicals, oils, and cotton. Some say that a
cigarette tb.rown .down a grating s·tarted the blaze;
others that chemical action prod~ced
so-called
'spontaneous oombu~:tion • • ~ 111 oO
58.
59 ~

S.BIS Report ·1914;·

J9 .. 20.

·Library of' uon.grea~, Division of ..i31bl1ography,
ot: References on Fire Prevention, June 12, 1912.

.Pelec,t _List

60. u The Story of the Vol turno ·~ The Outloolt, (October
25, 1913), 337; Letter, John Loohhead to .Au·thor March 7 1 1963.
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Tt.e role of 1·ilrcless 111 sturui:onin;; a

vesoels to

2.

point in uid-1\tlantic

m:~::~

nUJ1~ber

of rescue

prc.::.sc1l a.Jv the

·~imo

n.nd todp;y the VOLTURNO fire is ret;8.rcleti. no one of the first
cJ.enons'trations of what radio

c2.:.i

:1c if yropei"lY i:ce0..

One

dcmonstra ted that a •uni tea. ;.fatione oi' the Atlar..tlc' nou
could ..ce called. together to ecc t any e:Lcrc;cJ.1cy,"

But, of

course, there re,na:ins the fs.ct thct t:>G 111.'"cr~ t:cro lcot. 61

It is

1nterest1n~

· one 'directly
uHer~

0.fterm·.rc~

were

to

~oto CXJl~uations

fer this loss;

Hrotc:

ca ther·ec1

toc.;c tho:r·, th.si.1lcs to t.:~.e U[;ency

of the Marconigraph, the finest fleet of liners ever
aszemblod i.n the .:niddle of tllo ocee.n, c~11 fl tteC. wl th
the regulation nmnber of boats, but, owing to ·the
fierqc w:i.nu and furiouo 802., ;:..11 a1J00lutaly r>o·t·iCrless. rr62

gives s. clue to the proyer ye:::-s:p::cti-;rc.
. c~ t "'"h e
th
lJ

-rnn,...~:rr
~ ,.,.,...
An.
... ~.rJ.u_c~C·i:.1,

seamen, not enough

. . '.")
.ea:r1 y on t,ne a c~v.4e,
(:Pt~m

to

me.~-

It

~2s

oac.:.i notccl

C'1r·~
"u--:o
... ..."l'•J.·· e·~u. 0·11lv
" ._

;;.11 :1er boats; she thus

oarriec1 in only 88 surviv.ors. 6 ~
61. Keith Jameson, SO·? U
oat Sea
(Derby, Conn.: ;».ro:nc.rch Book:::, 19D2 , · 5 •

62.

.Arthur s~nure;.:eo~, lilltnir~:; of, ·V.-:o Vol turnQ. (Lo11do:n.:

Cassell and Company, Limited; 191.3), 14-4.

63.

Florence Kelley, "Seama11sl11p and Safety," §..uz:iret,

XXXI (:November 8, 1913) , 154--155 •
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CHAPTER IV
THE LOUDOH

1913 - 19?.3

Sinking of the TITJ\J~IC, the "unsinkable 11 aroused a

. call for a genera.l·conferenoe of seafaring natiions.on
safe"t:;y of life at sea, whioh was held c.. t London in 1913. 64
Sc.i_ent:J.fic 1.:.meric:.an; commented that

11

tlu.~ les~on

of the

'Titanic• disaster ho.s been laid uell ·i;o heart; und 1 t ls
realized that • • • every ship should bf'. made its

lifeboat."

01-rn

With the Int.ernational Conference soon ·bo ope:n

at London, "the burning of the 'Vol turno' e1agllasizes ·t;he
necessity for giving the deliber2.tions of -G:i.w.. t ga tb.erinJ;

the broadest possible scope by includ.:tng the subject oi' fire ·

,.._

protection.n?~

The fact was th.z. t fire was

problem s.bo2.rd. ships.

:i.ncreasj~11t;l;1

tecouiug a

Fic;ures for Britif:)h ships showed that

casualties generally declined steadily from 1890 to 1913;
the nUiuber inVOlYing loss Of life declined, L'.llU fire alone

among all causes for losses of shi:)s increasod.
combustionH as

a cause rose from

rra

ver;r smc..11

u i3pou·taneous

~flgt~J."'c"

to

about 1.5% of fires. ·Figures included: with 3,601 st0aE1el's
in Brl tish ret;:lstery in 1890, 55 ·we:r·e lo sJv to fi::."e; in
6l1-.

1loxd' s IJiDt,.£,nc1 8ht.n.r~JJ.~ .G,~f_e~, No. 35 (May

16, 19 29) ' 759.
.
.
65. rt T'.a.o Peril of J?ire a. t Seau 1 Scientific ..:'1.ncr:\can,

CIX (October 25, 1913), 31 1~.
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1913, fire clo.i::10d. 131-1- of the 4,062 stea!1rnrs registry listed.66
·I11spector-Ge:i1o:i...,o.l U:"lle:r 1-ms ri.~~:0;1('; the of:i':!.cial United

,Ste.tea iielegat0s to the Lendon Cou.fercnce anO. came <.1w::..y
convinced that

-~ueric~.n metb.od,s

of inspection were best., but

he called f'o:c ce1·t:..'..l11 othor reforn.s "beyond. those recommended

by th~ Confcrcnce.67
SU.Ii1...'!J.D. tion

Interna tlonal

of

..t~he

woric 2.t the Conference nas the

Cori..:V.~mtio11

document of its kind, n

o:n. Sa.f.ety of J..sife at Sea, first
ct~te~cnt

of proposed rules for

·safe construction an{l opern ti on of seac;oj_ng ships, which

waz

sub~lt·(;cd

to the si;::L.:;i.tory nat:lons for ratification.

l?rovisio11z i'or f'lro

s.:~fot3r \1CT(:~

of a ceneral ll2,ture, mainly

dealing 1·rit.h construction and procedures.

Article 1 2

· requir·eJ. f:l:rcp:coof bul1\:hcc.a.c not over 131 feet apart wl th
ii:reproof reccsscn i-:1 tJ'.".OT". r;md fireproof doors through them: ·
ca1\-;o or b8.llnst 1-rhi·Jh cnd.:::m_sered

~mssengers

i·ras forbidden

by iU'-~lolc 55 c. ncl .A~!..,ticlc 56 r0q_uirecl safety certi.ficatcs

which

~w'..lld iJG

:tsouccl ·by the re,z;:loterins nation of a ship

to assu:r3 -th:.."'.t it :-r\et intGr?l.r:ttional standnrcls.

Regulation

49 of the c.ppendix: to tho COUYention called for contlnUOUS
;l'ire pa. trol s..nc~ for nhips under 4, 000 tons to have two

fire ptltlps, those over that size to h?.ve tb..ree, with two

water j£its :tn any c.roc. of the ship, sufflcient fire ex-'tinguishers, at least two in eci,ch

66.

Sir Westcott

s.

~e.chinery ~~rea

along with

Abell, "Sea Casualties s.nd Loss of

Life" (galley proofs), (Newoastle-Upon-Tyne: Northeast Coast
Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders, 1921), galleys

3·, 4, 5.

28
~o.ch

two sets of smoke heL"Ilet and safety lam:p;

Ho1·rever, the si.fety

to inspect for fire sai'oty yearly.

regulations did not e.pply to

ar.~'"

nct1on was

but vesnels carryinr; over

twelve passengers two hundred miles from shore.GB

An exa.m}?le of' the enthusiasm over the results of the
Conference is the statement of E. T • Chaml..1er1a 1n i n_.·
'&..

introduc~nt.1;

the Convention to the Society of Naval Arch1tocts

and Marine Engineers:
11

T'l.le London Convention furnishes an j.1rrnetus
to h1rh o-r-:irlr.. co,.,st;"llCt·ion T-·oT'k .,..,
J..... · .... 11,.,+ ;L"'· t"l"lf'\ll"r'(•~·
-

::.:,)

(_)-. . . (;.., "4 ..._,

"'•-'•I

......

J ,;..,

•'-

t

J

~

,., .. --l...

\J,,._

~. V

+

U

,.- ,._ \,. ... .._,

I..,...._....

,

hJ

for such worlc international reoogn1 tion." b9
.A:ny enthusiasm for forthcoming unj.form international

safety regulations was dashed, howev-er, by the Great Uar.
As a result of hostili·ties,

·~he

Convention was never

ratified by all the signatories and thus never went into
effect; no nation completely ado,pted the rcquirerients of
the ag,-reernent unila. terallY• '(O

.

The report of the Supervisinc: ·rnspector-Gener8.l for
the following year after the Conference shows the actual
progress, or laclt of 1 t, since the GENER./L"L SLOCUI1 fire,

ten,years before.

-·--

67.

u1iler remarked that a travelling

SBIS Report 1915, 29.

68. ·United States Senate nocuncnt 463, 63rtl 0 )ngrosa,
Second. Session ( ln appendb: to :~i~.\\otlone__o.{_t!.1~_soc:Lety of
Nava1 Jl,tc}J.1 tects...rulllli.&.~:r:.1I1§......:eynr:\ng.~±:.§., XXI.L, 220, 230, 252,
272, 216l.
1

69. .E. T. Chamberlain, "International Ooni'erenoe on
Safety of Life at Sea", Transao1!lons
the Societz of Naval
Arch* ~e.,cts e.~d Ma~:t...ne En,gineerl2_; XXII, l.

o:
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inspector had just startccl work Emd hud uncovered E!everal

bad inspections, but was being rez;ard'11 ruefully by t!ic
The report continuer::

shipmn:1ers as a C.etectiv·e.

"While 1·re have been fortlmate ln not havi:ac any
great fires recently on e~i:curs1on st0am~r9, 1 t 1~
a. peril which none the lesn ex:tsts, £c1d thou~>
we may he~ve any number of regulations in regard to
fire-firshtint?; equipment, in orcJ.cr to prevent ouch
another disaster as occurred on the steamer
1
GeneraJ 0 1ocum
+1
ber.-·G·· i . r~~y ., ..... ~.<l
r~oy····o·rl"'I
.............
u ... v
v
,i... v"""' t .. 1('.'\
"""
cause for such a disaster and require absolute
fireproof construction of o=curalon stca~crs.
'fill.is can not be. done until Congress acts, and
the Dureau'moat earnestly invites ettontion to
the necessity for legislation in this res1)ect." 11
..__......._:~

1 "·'

.:J

f~.... ,

-.)...)

r

Uhler went on to examine other snfety

m~tters

to changes in ste.tut·e; 11hich he felt necessary,

in regards

1nclud1n.~

a new motor vessel law tha.t would be easier to understand and coverage of fire law to cover freighters.

He

wanted more control over dangerous cargoes and over
passengers on ferries; further, he asked for a plan of
oentralized approval of proposed ship plans by a boe.rd
of. a.rch1 tects

11i

W_?-shington. . :None of these were now

recommendations; in fact, all dated to the SLOCUH fire

and hefore. 7 2
A disaster

in Chicago brought the steamship safety

laws and inspection service under scrutiny next, and though
· 70 •. Board of Trade, Sa.fetx ,of Ltfe_ at Sen (London:
II. H. Stationery Ofi'ioe, 1927), 5.

71.

SBIS Report 1915, 20, 31.

72.

SBIS Report 1915, 30-34.
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1 t is not a. fire ITta tter, if results could be r:rnz.sured, 1 t

probably had ao much 1veicht in publj.c c.ttituc.es as eny
other disaster in relation to :::o.fcty.

.~!..:\DTL:!.l:D, e.n. e::··

ours ion boat, had capsized while being towed. a1my from

her berth in mid-city laden with 2,500 picnickers.

Her

1913 oertiflcate·had rated her for 600 panaengers and a
limit for excursion of five milen from shore; ho't'rever, Grand

Haven and Chicago luepeotors had allowed her to cross the
lake with four times tha·t number.
architect called her

11

At the hearings, her

born a greyhound ancl died a i1olf,"

·and said, "speed was the csoence of the contrcct, and
ca.rryin5-ca.pac1 ty a soconde.ry cons1.clero.t1011."
also found

th~~t,

It 'ims

by sone chance, the water ballast tanks

had been eu.pty an{l inoperable,

mak:i.~i.s

her unstable.

Inv.estlgationc of t.he disaster 1.ncluded
grand jury, a :?cdcral erand jury,

2,

t',.

73

Oook County

coroner's inquest,

Steamboa:t-Inspectlon 3orv:lce investi:;atlon, awl a separate
of Conr:tcrcf'.:l l'Till:te.n O. Reel.field. 74
Inngector-Gcnoral Uhler' s neJ..:t report pointed out

tha·t excursioulsts h9.d become a:ware that the steamers they

were ridlng w0ra ovarloaded, but he maintained that the
local i"'.lspectors, 1cnowin5 the ship, were best qualified

---· ....

73.

LI

(~ugust

7 1 1915), 231-233.

"The 1'iastlend Inon1ry11 t !PJlr.OHt.lQ..Q.Ji;., CX (August
1915), 939; (August 1a; 19151, 88~.
711..

25 1

"Chicago's Supreme Tragedy", I1he Litera.If D:);p~est,
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set the passenger limit.

The bureau at the time of his

1916 report was preparing legislation to present to
Congress 1n the spring of 1917.75
Changes in the steamboat law somewhat more satisfactory to the Inspection Servioe were made as a result
of the investigation toward better handling overloading.
Under the system, a supervising inspector checked on a
local inspector, and any local inspector in doubt
'

became able to call in an Inspection Service stability
expert; still the law applied only to passenger ships,
leaving freight steamers still outside most safety lawa.76 .
The EASTLAND disaster focused more attention on
hul.l inspection and architectural examination of plans
to assure proper stability.77

The Board of Supervising

Inspectors ruled in January 1922 that inclining tests
should be run on all major size vessels; the Supervising
Inspector-General repeated a request he had made before
for some sort of beard of naval architects at Washington
to examine plans for stability and remove the cost of
inclining the vessels themselves.

Inclining tests,.for

want of such a board; continued to be made on many shipa.7 8

75 •. SBIS Report 1916, 29.
76.

SBIS Report 1917, 24.

77. SBIS Report 1919. 18.
78.

SBIS Report 1922, 22, 23; 1925, 1.
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The old proplem of jurisdiction over motor vessels
by

the. Inspection Service kept cropp.ing up. . Though

motor boat aots had been passed, they were vague and
In~pector..:General

inadequate; the

questioned his own

r

autho·r1 ty ·over lagre motor ships· and asked a clearer
•'

'

:

.

.

control act in. 1920; in 1924. the
Board of Supervising
.
Inspectors assumed suoh jurisdiction on the basis of
certain. vague wordinga, ,.)f'hioh the solioi tor of' the Board
questioned as to appl1oability.79

79. SBIS Report 1924, 21; 1920t 25.
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CHAPTER V

TRElNDS OF EXPERT OPINION DURING THE PERIOD

Geo~ge

w.

Wylie. of the_ O~yde-Mallory Steam~h1p

Company, speaking at the Sixth National Safety Congress,
1916, listed the important.developments of the.previous

few years thus:
(A) The International Oonferenoe o~ Safety of Life
· ·at Sea (supra, P• 27) ·

(B) · The Seamen's Act .
01f ~!a.king Passenger Vessels
frq~ Destruction by Fire (infra)

(C) The Conference

More Secure

(D) Reports of th~ Supervising Inspector-General
(E) The Report of the EASTLAND Investigation
Commission lsttora, P• 30 ). Bo
.

Other than the

meeti~gs

and investigations already

mentioned, there was one particularly important conference
~011oerned

exolusively with fire, held in the office of the

Secretary of.Commerce in 1916. 81
Secretary ReO..field presided at the meeting with

representatives of shipbuilders, shippers, Olmers, the
Navy, and the seamen; though the conference was very 1n-·

form.al, a transcript was fortunately ta.ken.

Bo.

George

The Secretary

w.

Wylie, "Safety First in Coastwise
Shipping", National Safety Congtess Proceedings (New
York, September 14, 1917), 599.

81. "Advisory Conference on the Subject of Makinw
Passenger Vessels More.secure from Destruction by Fire
pamphlet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916)
hereafter referred to as "Advisory Oonferedoe".

34

noted that there had been 63 more or less total losses
to .American vessels from fire 1n the previous two years
and that 31 extra inspectors had been added as one of the

measures to combat hazardous conditions; the meeting
was called .to suggest further measures and leg1slations. 82
Stevenson Taylor, president of the .American Bureau
of Shipping, remarked that the rebuilding of the Fall
River liner PLYMOUTH in 1907 after her destruction by
fire to the waterline had made her the most praot1cal
type of fire resistant vessel.

Rebuilding with an all

steel superstructure, he said; would have been impractical,
causing a fourteen•inch loss 0£ freeboard plus increased

weigh.t. 83

w. o.

Teague had said before the Society of Naval

Architects and Marine Engineers two years before that

it was practical to substitute steel for wood with a
ten per cent rise in cost, wh1.oh ship01mers had wrongly
oalled prohibitive.

Warren T. Berry, however, at the

meeting, had argued that the cost was far above Teague's
estimates.8 4
Non-flammable wood had been one other partial attempt
some had proposed toward fire safety even before the
I

82.

Advisory Conference, 1•4.

83. Advi.sory Conference, 7 •
84, w. o. Teague, "Safety of Life From Fire at Sea",
Transactions of t}le Socyety of Naval Architects and
Marine Engineers, XXII 1914), 35, 38.
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PLYMOUTH re.building. 85

Asbestos and paper pulp boards

were other alternatives to ordinary wood.

E. E.

Olcott, of the Hudson River Day Line. cited at the advisorif
oonterenoe that asbestos had been usei on the crew areas
of the new WASHINGTON IRVING,. but that this material was
heavy and brittle; steel casing had been used over wood
as a substitute device.86
Engineering journalists were enthusiastic about the
IRVING.

The use of fire resistant construction had

been "wherever practical usage will permit •

. .",

places as fire rooms, the galley, and so on.

uThe

in such

risk of fire on such a vessel is reduced to practically
nil," the same ·report oont,µued. 87
1'he one previous experiment with fttrther fireproofing
..

had been the JAMESTOWN, called all-steel, but actually

with as muoll steel as technology at that time had known

how to install.

This made her ten per cent heavier, though

her deoks were still of wood, but encased in metal.

Her

builder, William Gatewood of Newport News Shipbuilding
and Drydock Corporation, oame out flatly and stated that

nothing further on fireproofing excursion boats past the
JAMESTOWN would be praotioal, though he declined to call

-·

86.

Advisory Conference, 9.
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her strictly a fireproof ahip. 88
Bulkheads were another prime top1o introduced in
the advisory oonf'erence first in the matter of the
PLn10UT~,

whioh had been equipped with two transverse

bulkheads for fire proteo.t1on when rebuilt, w1 th doors

at the ends of her engine and boiler enclosures and in
saloon

passages~

Gatewood countered tho. t Ne1i'port News

opposed fire doors on day liners as an obstacle to
firefighting and movement of people rather than as a
buffer to stop fires at bullcheads.89

Ships of' the

time were generally built ·with the main cargo deck open

the entire length of the ship; fire could spread to
all areas through the hatch covers at any point; the

engine rooms were not always "bulkheaded off from the
rest of the sh!p.• 9°

At this.

par~icular

time. the United States had

been recommending at i:u.ternationai meetings that

flammable materials be 1cept at least a foot from either
side of metal· subdivision bulkheads in ships carrying

·' s7. "Hud~on River Steamer Washillgton Irving" t
I;qtema1(io;qa:J. r~arine. Engineering, .XVII (July, 1913>, 276.
88.

Advisory Conference, 14, 15.

, 89 •. . Advisory . oonrerence, 8, 15 •

90.

Letter, E. J. Tracy to Author, March 4, 1961.
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cargo as a measure against heat conducted through meta1.91
· PLYMOUTH had had sprinlclers throughout when rebuilt;
these were attached. to th9 firo pump syotem, ·which ·

featured separate lines to eaoh station from the pumps,
·so that: i f one fire station's line uas.brokon, it could

be shut off independent ~of ..1.ihe rest of the system. 92 .
Use of aprlliklera engendered more oontroversy
among.ship operators and builders then any other fire
safet1 matter during the period.· There were aotua1ly
three points of view we have been able to discern;
first, there was, of oourse, a party opposed to all
sprinkler syste.ms.

Then there was the controversy

between the "Wet.system" (having water in the sprinkler
lines at all times; under pressure), and the "Dry

System'' (in which an engineer turned water into lines .
feeding sprinklers which were always open, upon alarm
of fire).
An a tta'ck on sprinklers was made 1n the discussion

on

w. o.

and

w.

Teague's paper cited above by Warren T. Berry

D. Forbes 1n 1914.

Teague had stated that

sprinklers cost about four dollars each, and 13erry
oountered that the cost was more like seven dollars; he
. 91.

Informal London 09nference, November-December

.

1921 1 Sat:et:r of Life at Sea "Copied from Document obtained

from files of State Department 580.7A1/213" {Washington:
·United States Shipping Board, mimeograph MSS, 1928), 4B.
92.

Advisory ·oonfer~nce, 8.
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argUe'd that cargo breaks off sprinkler heads and is likely
to damage the ship and its contents 1.f filled with water.
Forbes backed him by aaying that Captain Francis Inch of
the· VOLTurum had told him that spr1n..1tlers would not have
helped in his case because the fire was guarded by
of cargo from any firefightinG from overhead.

l~yers

He compared

sprinklers to "spit on a match" and said their usefulness
was liinited to small fires, advocating instead a simple
perforated pipe dry system tied to a thermostat.93

Scientific .American, on the other hand, said, "Why is
it that the automatic sprinkler, which has

~roved

so

highly efficient ashore, ha.s not been applied to the
protection of sh1ps? 0 94
However the arguments might have raged, a rule of
the Board of Supervising Inspectors made April 8, 1916
required sprinlclers and metal sheathing of exposed areas.95

By 1919 insurance authors were bola

enough to say that

the United States had better firefighting equipment than
the Europeans, and that automatic sprinklers were the
principal reason.

Until forced by the rule, naval architects

had .failed to adapt sprinklers suooess.f'ully to ships beoause

ot the danger ot water damage from damage to the sprinlclers,
using the movement of cargoes and the wrenohing of a hull
O. Teague, .2.14• c1 t., 45-lf6.

93..

W.

94.

Soientif1o American, October 25, 19131 19..9.· c\t.
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The com:promise was a dry system

during rough weather.

1.n which a thermostat 1n a hold or other closed place
activated a.n automatic fire pump, whioll fed uate:t" into

a sprinkler system in which the sprinkler heads were always

open to a possible flow of water.

Shipowners, however,
continued to minimize the value of such devices.9 6

Cigarettes bore, as they still do, the biggest blame
for ship fires at the time.

The Hudson River Day Line

representative at the advisory meeting a·tressed that
no matter how fire resistant a ship was, ·the smelting

habit was the uncontrollable factor.97 One old shipping
hand put it to the author this rray:
ttThe main difficulty with fires aboard ship is
the cigarette fires, A large percentage of such
fires could be avoided if those confounded coffin
nails were completely banished." 98
Teague listed smoking as one of his principal five
causes· of .f'ira 1 along w1 th .:spon·ta.neous combustion,
volatile oils, ltoodwork in contact with steam pipes,

and def act1ve ·wiring. 99 ·
Tobacco 1s not the ·only human problem necessary to
{

discuss; it falls as only part of the matter of concerned

95,

Advisory Conference, 24.

96. The Eas~exn
J~uary ·31, 1919, 29.

Und~r;-rriter,

97.

Advisory Conf6reuce, 10.

98.

Letter, J.

99.

w. o.

1\..

Marine Edition,

Bossen to author, January 10, 1961.

Teague, .2l2.• ~., 34.
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at'tention to the aims of. fire prevention at ell levels.
E.

c.

Bennett of the Fore

Rive~

Shipbuilding Corporation

brought this out at the aa.visory meetine: thls l-ray-:

at

"We have not ye.t found in building boa ts
Fore River a sh1pormer·who paid extraordinary
attention to fire prevention, other than that
required by the United States supervising inspeo·~ors and clo.ss!.i'lo_a tion societies. 0 1

The Fall River Line, its representative pointed out
at the advisory meeting, had mu1nta1ned a better than

average record of fire safety; he attributed this to
an administrative policy of" constant fire drills a.nd
inspeotions.2

Andrew Furuseth, phlegmatic Seamen'a Unlon president,
advocated a call bell operated from

bridg~

to crew quar.ters

to more effectively rouse men to fig,ht a fire, since ships
1n that period were getting larger and communications more

difficult due to distance.

Furuseth threw in the comment here

that it was the cargo and not the ship itself that most

frequently bit.rned.3
Statistics showed that Furuseth was substan.t1ally

correct in this latter statement.

In a survey of United

States ship fires from 1911 to mid-1920, it was found
that 65% started balo1'1 dec~s, and of these, 72% were in

--

1.

Advisory Conference, 19.

2.

Advisory Conference, 8. .

3.

Advisory Conference, 51.
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cargoes.

Yet, though fire alarms l'Tere required, there

is evidence that the inspectors in practice did not
require them in cargo areas,4

Stowage of cargo so as to prevent spontaneous combustion 1n cargoes and 1'al1-important" patrols of

out-of-the•way parts of the ship had long

bee~

urged

as the easier way to prevent large fires; by catching
them small.5

too

~arge t_9

Control of small fires before they got
fight was the subject of several papers.

Sachs called for buckets and hand

pu.~pa a3

the most

effective preventive to keep small fires from spread1ng.9

The principal recommendation on .fire safety at the
international shipping conference of 1928, in faot, 1-raa
the calling for sand or other dry material to be kept
in the stokehold of oil-burning steamers to smother

011 fires lL~ely to start there.7
The Rich System of !'ire deteotion was hailed

as a

great adva.noe at the time; it consisted of a series of
pipes from each compartment of the ship to a box in the
pilot house.

This box had a glass front and an outlet

1nto the are within the pilot house.

Through the O:t>ening,

4. R. G. Skerrett, "Fire s. t Sea", Scientific Ai11erica.n,
CXXVII (August, 1922)t 81.

5.· Sachs, .2.U• oit., 276.
6.

~·· 276.
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smolce from the holds· could pass into ·the pilot house
and be smelled, alerting -Che officer on Cf.uty, wh() could

look into the box and see which pipe, and thus which

hold, smoke was coming from.

He could. then, through the
same pipe, send steam by a valve system into the hold. 8
Steam for fire extiLguishing was an old standby; in
1914 the Stearaboat .. Inspection Service was calli113 it

the best way to fight a fire in. a hold,

be·t ter

tb.an

flooding, which caused a stability problem, or gases,

wh1oh llad not yet proven their worth.9
Carbon dioxide as a smothering agent bad been widely

suggested, but was not as simple to proylde as steam.
One solution 1-re.s to install carbon dioxide generators. 10
Another contemporary idea
gas in

forty-~of:md

liUS

to carry the carbon dioxide

tubest one for each thousand cubic

feet of air space enclosed L'l holds; Teague held that
this gas was impractical to manufacture on a ship, but
that sulphur dioxide as a smothering agent had been
made and used success.fully on ships at sea. 11
United States Shippi...~g Bo~rd, Sa~et3 ot ~1~~
from D~scussions, Reports, an~ ,Res-

E::::tr~cts

Shipping Board, 1928), 27.

8. Skerrett; Jlll• 0,1t.; cf. F. S. Ti'tsworth, address
before Marine Insurance Club1 Wc.ldcrf•.!storia Hotel, Mew
York, April 12, 1920, 4-5·
9.

Teague, .2Jl• cit., 36.
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Yet, with all this discussion

011 1·rhat

makes a ship

fire-safe, it is appropriate to 'note that about ·cwenty
years after the advisory coni'erence, t'i1e HOR.tl.O C.d.S TLE

burned.

Though she had been a new ship, her furnishings,

panelings, and staircases were of combustible material;

. she ·was open through _stairwells between decks, a· feature
which made these escape routes into chimneys instead.

She had all the required extinguishers and alarms, but
the latter were not in the public areas where the fire
'.

got 1 ts headway.

Carbon dioxi.de outlets were located in

the holds and engine spaces only and there were no
Result: fire got its headway 1n the writing
room and the ship was lost. 12
sprinklers.

Even though such abuses were permitted even after the
peri~d

under study, the .fatality rate for American seamen

in 1917 was still only three per thousand as compared to
'

the British rate of five per thousand.

13

10,, J. E.. w. Currier, "Fire in Ships and its Prevention", ~c1entit+c .American, XCVII(July 20, 1907), 47.
11.

Teague, ou. c~-f{ .• , 38.

12.

Franlt Rushbroolc, Fire Apoard (London: Technical

Press. 1961), 52.

13. F. L. Hoffman, ''The Aooide~t Haza.rd ~ the
Americs..n Marchand Marine", !fat;tona~. ).Jafety ConP.:I ess
P;:gceeq1ngs, New York, September 1 , 1917, 602.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY Alm CONCLUSIONS G.AIMED FRON THIS STUDY

Since the na·ture

or

this study ·was political, economic,

and technical, there have been quite a few f1t,ru.res studied
in attempting to gain a picture .of advances made 1.n a ·very

human problem: safety of life

fr~m

fire at sea.

In such

a study1 then, it seems meet for the final chapter to deal
with the hrtman

values~.

But before we go into purely human aspects, there
are two appended tables here to study, ·which are by way

of Slllmlla.ries•

The first; a chart of losses by fire for

the first decade of

~he

period under atudy, is interesting

in that the total number of fires for 1905 was identical

to the number for 1914; there were more lives lost per

year, .with one exception, toward the encl of the decade

than in the earlier part.

Oontrest this 1·ri th the erowth

0£ the persomiel of .the Steamboat-Inspection Servioe, and

a question is sure to arise.

That question is:

In the light of these two charts, and oonaidering
the facts previously presented in this study, can
1 t be said that there 1-TaS a.ctu~lly any progress made
in the general field of m.ak:1ng .American shipping as
a whole secure from loss by fire?
Since this study at the outset was predicated on the

. id.ea that there was indeed action d~ring the period,
especiaJ.ly after the SLOCffi.1 fire, thio is the question

which must be at least tentatively answered by this paper.

CHART OF LOSSES BY FIRE TO AMERICAN VESSELS, 1905-14,, COMPILED FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS AND MARINE ENGINERRS, NATIONAL ARCHIVES
PERIOD ENDED

iLA.::1::1

~

FREIGHT

TOW

FERRY

MOTORS HIP

STEAM YACHT
(PLEASURE)

MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL
VESSELS

--

LIVES LOST
PASS. CREW

:zJ::S:!Eit.·

iisENGER

PROPERTY \-OSS

EXPLOSIONS
GAS BOILER

12/31/05

8

9

16

3

1

3

0

40

0

3

$554,000

2

l

12/31/06

7

8

17

l

0

1

0

34

0

6

1,893,000

0

l

12/31/07

19

25

26

l

3

2

0

76

23

lA

1,567 ,ooo

12/31/08

4

22

19

l

1

0

3

50

0

3

666,000

12/31/09

11

23

14

0

2

0

1

51

0

14

1, 294,000

0

1

12/31/10

13

15

16

1

3

2

2

52

0

7

1,055,000

0

0

12/31/11

14

12

9

1

2

1

0

39

0

8

732,000

0

1

4

6

6

1

1

0

0

18

0

3

237,000

0

0

11

1

2

2

1

35

2

5

1,120,000

1

0

1

1

0

0

40

1

9

649,000

3

0

11

16

11

435

26

76

$9,767,000

13

6

6/30/12

f

,:j

6/30/13

6

12

t

j

6/30/14

13

17

TOTALS:

99

149

8 (?)

6

1

l

1

...:

-142

7
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In the first chapter; we retraced some of the high
points of fire safety rules up to the period under study;
there, e.s well e.s in the body of the pa.per proper, a
significant trend was disoernable of action follouiu,..u

most frequently upon public
walte of

in~ignation

some spectaou.lar disaster.

or concern in the

We have

mentio~ed

the

L:SX:IllGTON 1 GRIFFITH, SLOCUM, TITANIC, VOLTTJRNO, nnd

EASTLAlID disasters and the uproc.rs ·which followed them.

But 1 t has also been sho1m how the legisla ~ion which
follorred ea.ch of these disasters was not n. now· idea at the

time, but an enactment of one principle or another

tll~t

the experts and safety men had been calling for previouoly.

Furthermore, it ha.a been significant to note durin0 the
period under study that the enactments of Conercos did not

represent the solutions to the problems 2s recommended;
but were only as much as \ms necessary to placa tc the

voters.
~nis

brings up the question of pressure groups of

shipowners and bu1l{lers.•

What :pe.rt did they

pl~y

in

retardlng legislation ·which !'.11C,'J,_t prove costly to them?
Clues to this matter might come from the statements 1n
connection with the sprinkler controversy; purely safety-

minnad writers were ·advocating sprtnklers, as ue have
shown, long before they were reg_v.ired by law.

1·lhen the

law fina.lly dicl require these aevices; the shfpowners found

•

1919 - 385

PERSONNEL
OF THE STEAMBOAT-INSPECTION SERVICE FOR JUNE 30 OF YEARS SHOWN,

compiled by the author !'rom the annual reports 01' the supervising
inspector-general, National Archives, MSS and printed reports.

1918 - 321

1914 - 266

I_

1915 - 267

-
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ways to install them without bankrupting themselves.
Indications

or

a motor vessel lobby, whether formal

or informal, appear in the repeated attempts of the
Steamboat-Inspection Service to get authority at least
to assure the minimum safety standards on such vessels.
Because there were no serious disasters on motor vessels
in 11h1ch these inadequacies cost any great nunber of'

lives, the Supervising Inspector-General
well have been tallcing to a stone

mi~ht

just ao

1~all.

Corruption in lower levels was evidently rn..rnpant,

from some or the indications.

We note the findincs of

the inquiries after the GENERAL SLOCU:-! fire in 1·rhich
inspectors themselves

we~e

found very culpable.

Grosvenor's

statement about ships going to 1-There inspection was most

lax would tend to raise a question about the honesty of
the execution of what laws there were.

Inspector-General

Uhlert on the other hand, nppears to be more sincere than
his field sta.f.f.

However, :tn readin1:; the quarter century

of his reports, one cannot help but sense an air

pleading against

or

futile

~dds.

But the question as posed is whether or not George

Uhler left the

ine~ection

and safety of .American steamers

in any better state in1en he retired 1n 1925 than they ha.d
been 111 when the GEifE.R.AL SLOOUM bu.rned.
conclusion would be a conditional "yes".

Our considered

On paper, the

47
situation was comparat1vely excellent beside 1rha+. 1t had
been in 1904.

But even "ff! th these improvements, the human

errors or deliberate indifference to safe practice were
enough to cause the MORRO CASTLE fire, or more

r~cently

the U. S. S. 08.NSTELLATION or H..illINE SULPHUR QUEEM di:msters.

Perhaps the best summary of the human

fcc~or

in

saf'ety is made by Edmund A. Walsh, t·rho besides being a
marine expert, is a priest and probably

t10!"C

lili:cly to

be sensitive to this matter:
"No amount of inanimate equipment in steel,
fireproofed wood or asbestos can replace
leadersh1~, clear thinki.ng and iron in the souls
of man."14

Edmund A. Walsh, s. J., phins and N~tional Safety
· (Washin~tons Georgetown Un1versity School of .Eoreign Service,
1934)' 51.
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